- NHS hospital
Eastbourne District General Hospital
Assessment report published 12 November 2026
Contents
On this page
- Overview
- Shared direction and culture
- Capable, compassionate and inclusive leaders
- Freedom to speak up
- Workforce equality, diversity and inclusion
- Governance, management and sustainability
- Partnerships and communities
- Learning, improvement and innovation
Well-led
We looked for evidence that there was an inclusive and positive culture of continuous learning and improvement based on meeting the needs of people who used services and wider communities. We checked leaders proactively supported staff and collaborated with partners to deliver care that was safe, integrated, person-centred and sustainable, and to reduce inequalities.
At our last assessment we rated this key question good. At this assessment the rating has changed to requires improvement. This meant the service did not always have effective governance to deliver consistent safe and high-quality, person-centred care.
The service was in breach of legal regulation in relation to good governance. We found governance, risk management and assurance arrangements were not effective.
We have not awarded this service a score for Well-led. Find out about when we will not publish a key question score and what we look at when we assess Well-led.
We looked for evidence that there was an inclusive and positive culture of continuous learning and improvement based on meeting the needs of people who used services and wider communities. We checked leaders proactively supported staff and collaborated with partners to deliver care that was safe, integrated, person-centred and sustainable, and to reduce inequalities.
At our last assessment we rated this key question good. At this assessment the rating has changed to requires improvement. This meant the service did not always have effective governance to deliver consistent safe and high-quality, person-centred care.
The service was in breach of legal regulation in relation to good governance. We found governance, risk management and assurance arrangements were not effective.
Capable, compassionate and inclusive leaders
The service had inclusive leaders who understood the context in which they delivered care, treatment and support and embodied the culture and values of their workforce and organisation. Leaders had the skills, knowledge and experience, however, clinical leadership was not always effective with nursing and medical lead roles not always working effectively together.
Service leads we spoke with generally demonstrated the skills, knowledge and experience required for their roles. They described recent divisional restructuring designed to strengthen leadership, including the introduction of a new nurse manager role in the emergency department. Leaders also told us a restructuring of lead medical roles was underway, which created some uncertainty for staff at the time of our assessment.
The department had a clinical leadership structure, however, leadership roles did not always work effectively together. The skills, knowledge and experience of leaders were not always used to best effect. For example, we saw there were prolonged periods of up to 1 to 2 hours where there was no direct communication between the Nurse in Charge and Consultant in Charge. This reduced oversight of department pressures and may have delayed decisions needed to manage patient flow and risk. Responsibility for managing crowding, patient flow and clinical risk rested largely with nursing leadership, with limited evidence of shared operational decision-making. Following feedback to service leads we were told there were plans in place to co-locate the emergency physician in charge (EPIC) and the nurse in charge (NIC) to ensure greater situational awareness.
Service leaders were visible in the service and approachable for patients and staff. We saw senior trust leaders present in the emergency department. Staff consistently told us leaders were visible and regularly visited the department and associated services.
The trust provided leadership development opportunities for staff. It had an established executive leadership programme, and a staff leadership programme was in development. This included bitesize leadership training and more structured development opportunities for staff across roles and grades.
Freedom to speak up
The service fostered a positive culture where people felt they could speak up and their voice would be heard.
Staff told us they felt able to speak up should they need to. There was a freedom to speak up policy and staff knew how to access this and how to contact the freedom to speak up guardian team. A summary of ‘speak up’ concerns in the 12 months prior to our assessment showed 15 cases had been raised by emergency department staff during the period, which was 9% of the overall ‘speak up’ caseload. Staff were able to raise concerns anonymously and were supported to seek further support as needed. The freedom to speak up team actively engaged with staff and visited ED, particularly during times of high pressure.
Patients and carers had opportunities to give feedback on the service they received in a manner that reflected their individual needs. The digital Friends and Family Test (FFT) survey involved sending patients a text message or electronically calling their home landline if they didn’t have a mobile number. They were asked to rate their experience between 1 and 5 (1 being equal to a very good experience). Results for Eastbourne ED showed 78% of patients in January 2026 rated the service 1 or 2, which was reflective of a positive experience and in line with average national results for emergency departments.
Patients, relatives and carers had opportunities to give feedback on the service they received by visiting the trust’s patient advice and liaison service (PALS) or through the trust’s website, telephone, form or email.
Managers and staff had access to the feedback from patients, carers and staff and used it to make improvements. Patient experience was central to the development and design of services.
Workforce equality, diversity and inclusion
The service valued diversity in their workforce. They work towards an inclusive and fair culture by improving equality and equity for people who work for them.
The trust’s equality, diversity and inclusion (EDI) policy set out a commitment to diversity and inclusion for patients, visitors and staff, following legislation that included the Equality Act 2010. The trust monitored and reported annually on gender, ethnicity and disability pay gaps. The trust followed national reporting requirements. They devised an annual equality report and had equality, diversity and inclusion improvement plans. Equality objectives included support for neurodiverse colleagues, supporting staff to tailor care towards cultural needs and embedding reasonable adjustment processes across the trust.
Leaders said the service had worked to recruit and retain staff. However, there were still some vacancies across the department. The trust was undergoing an organisational structure review which included standardisation of some staff roles.
In the most recent NHS national staff survey (2025) results were similar to the national average in relation to diversity, equality and inclusion. Leaders told us there were equality and diversity champions within the emergency department and we saw there were equality and diversity networks operating across the trust. These included LGBTQIA+, race and disability networks.
Staff were able to apply to work flexibly to account for personal circumstances such as caring responsibilities and health issues. Managers put reasonable adjustments in place for staff members to help them carry out their role.
The trust undertakes equality monitoring of staff within the service to ensure it is diverse in its make-up and representative of the patient group.
Governance, management and sustainability
We scored the service as 1. The evidence showed significant shortfalls. The service did not have clear responsibilities, roles, systems of accountability and good governance. They did not act on the best information about risk, performance and outcomes, or share this securely with others when appropriate.
The service's governance processes did not consistently ensure people were assessed and treated in line with expected standards of care. This included people experiencing long waits for medical review. Processes to identify concerns were not always effective in improving performance. Concerns we identified as part of our assessment in relation to patient flow and paediatric provision were recognised by senior service staff, but insufficient action had been taken to improve.
Governance processes did not always support the effective identification, escalation and mitigation of risks. The top 4 urgent care risks recorded on the risk register were poor patient flow, delays in out-of-hours assessments, nursing vacancies, and violence and aggression. We saw actions had been identified to address some of these risks, including the introduction of body worn cameras for security staff and the redeployment of staff from other areas of the hospital to increase nurse staffing levels.
However, action planning was not consistently clear for all risks. For example, a December 2024 update to the risk register recorded that the rapid assessment process in the emergency department had been discontinued because it was "not seen as productive". There was no documented rationale for this decision or evidence of further action to address the impact on patient flow. We also identified risks that were not recorded on the risk register, including limited oversight of the waiting room and the associated risk to patient safety. Department leaders were aware of this concern when it was raised during the assessment, but it had not been formally captured or managed through governance processes.
This reduced the service's ability to demonstrate that known risks were being consistently assessed, monitored and addressed, increasing the risk that opportunities to improve patient safety and flow could be missed.
There was a governance structure with lines of accountability from the urgent care division to the overall trust board. There were direct lines of accountability through to the emergency department with governance, clinical, nursing and operations leads. Leaders told us of changes to the divisional structure that were taking place at the time of our assessment. We were told this was to improve leadership and support future plans.
Leaders did not use audit findings effectively to drive improvement. The service used a range of audit programmes to monitor safety and quality. However, audit findings were not always consistent, and actions to address identified concerns were not clearly defined. For example, documentation audits reported 100% compliance in August 2025, while other audit data from the same period identified gaps in the completion of repeat observations, sepsis actions and domestic abuse screening. This meant the service could not always be assured that audit processes accurately reflected practice or that identified areas for improvement were being effectively addressed, limiting its ability to drive and monitor improvements in care quality and patient safety.
The service did not consistently monitor key aspects of performance. For example, leaders told us that nursing competency completion was approximately 50%; however, the education dashboard was not consistently up to date, limiting effective oversight. In addition, while patient flow was identified as a key challenge within the emergency department, the service did not routinely monitor specialty response times, despite their impact on patient flow and timely care. This limited the service's ability to identify, understand and address performance issues. As a result, leaders could not be fully assured that staff competencies were up to date or that delays affecting patient flow were being effectively monitored and managed.
There were governance meeting structures in operation to review performance and safety within the department. Records of governance meetings demonstrated issues of quality and safety were discussed. We saw meetings included a review of incidents, complaints, performance, staffing, clinical effectiveness and divisional risks. Quality and safety data was collated and used to inform discussions. Specialist reports were reviewed at governance meetings. These included quality and safety reports, performance and staffing, service changes and winter planning. Performance data was used to escalate and share quality and safety information with divisional leads through governance structures, and with the trust board through the trust wide committee structure.
We were told that formal staff meetings were not held regularly due to difficulties with attendance and service pressures. However, there were processes to share information and learning with frontline staff. We saw there were monthly newsletters shared with staff teams. These included a breakdown of incidents, complaints, audits, shared learning and quality improvement. Email updates were also shared with staff and critical information was shared at huddles and handovers.
There were quality boards in areas of the department, but these were incomplete at the time of our assessment. While we saw information on quality was shared with staff via the monthly newsletters, this information was not visible within the department.
Partnerships and communities
The service understood their duty to collaborate and work in partnership, so services work seamlessly for people. They share information and learning with partners and collaborate for improvement.
The service worked with external partners to improve patient flow and admission avoidance which relied on the availability of community services for people to use instead of attending hospital.
Directorate leaders engaged with external stakeholders and patient feedback was shared with the trust. They also worked closely with commissioners and described examples of pilot projects, including with the local ambulance service to form closer working relationships and redirection of patients away from the emergency department to help manage unnecessary admissions. Work included collaborating to ensure ambulance staff could access specialist advice e.g. acute physician or frailty input to support admission avoidance for patients who could be cared for in the community.
Senior leaders gave us examples of collaborative working with ambulance, mental health and frontline GP services. We saw a project in operation where the service worked with the local GP federation to redirect patient from the urgent treatment centre to available GP appointments where that was the most appropriate streaming route. There had been 111 referrals to GP appointments during the pilot, which was 40% usage of available appointments. Leads were in the process of seeking to extend this work alongside increasing awareness and usage of the available GP appointments.
The service worked with the local mental health trust to improve the psychiatric liaison service within the emergency department. In addition, they worked to expand onsite mental health specialist support due to the increase in patients presenting with acute mental health problems.
Learning, improvement and innovation
The service did not always fully focus on continuous learning, innovation and improvement across the organisation and local system. They did not always encourage creative ways of delivering improvements in a continuous and sustained way.
Staff were not always given the time and support to develop opportunities for improvements and innovation. Most staff we spoke with told us there were issues with capacity and they weren’t always given the time or support needed to focus on improvements.
We saw there were quality assurance and improvement processes in place. However, the actions to ensure sustained improvement were not always clear or consistent. At our 2018 inspection we found there were gaps in records of baseline observations and critical information. While at this assessment we found that baseline observations were completed at triage, we found that repeat observations were inconsistent. We saw there were audits of repeat observations of patients waiting in the emergency department, but these audits showed consistent poor results and action to improve was unclear.
Staff used quality improvement methods; however, these were not always applied appropriately. For example, we saw that work had been undertaken to improve the timeliness of triage of patients on arrival to the department. Staff told us that adaptations had been made to the triage system to try and improve efficiency. Data showed that triage times were close to the national target. However, the quality of triage was variable, with information missing and not following national guidance. This meant that the identification of deterioration relied primarily on individual nurse vigilance and informal escalation, rather than on systematised processes.
Staff participated in national audits relevant to the service and learned from them. For example, we were told the service had participated in Royal College of Emergency Medicine (RCEM) quality improvement projects relating to frailty screening and risks associated with mental health and self-harm.