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Eastbourne District General Hospital

Overall: Requires improvement read more about inspection ratings

Kings Drive, Eastbourne, East Sussex, BN21 2UD 0300 131 4500

Provided and run by:
East Sussex Healthcare NHS Trust

Assessment report published 12 November 2026

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Safe

Requires improvement

12 November 2026

We looked for evidence that safety was a priority for everyone, and leaders embedded a culture of openness and collaboration. We checked people were safe and protected from bullying, harassment, avoidable harm, neglect, abuse and discrimination. We also checked people’s liberty was protected where this was in their best interests and in line with legislation.

At our last assessment we rated this key question requires improvement. At this assessment the rating remains requires improvement. This meant some aspects of the service were not always safe and there was limited assurance about safety. There was an increased risk people could be harmed.

The service was previously in breach of legal regulation in relation to safe care and treatment. At this assessment the service remained in breach of this regulation. We also found that the service was in breach of legal regulation in relation to staffing.

Although the service had made some improvements since our last visit, the volume of patients visiting the department meant treatment and care was not always provided in a safe way. Patients did not always have timely access to assessment or treatment. There were long waits for some patients in corridors and across the department and long waits for medical reviews. Staffing was not always sufficient. There was not a clear exclusion criteria for children and young people where paediatric provision was limited within the department. Patients did not always have repeat observations when waiting in the department and oversight of the waiting area was limited. Improvements as a result of lessons learned were not always made and medicines were not always managed in a safe way. 

 

We have not awarded this service a score for Safe.

Find out about when we will not publish a key question score and what we look at when we assess Safe.

Learning culture

Score: 3

We scored the service as 3. The evidence showed a good standard. The service had a proactive and positive culture of safety, based on openness and honesty. They listened to concerns about safety and investigated and reported safety events. Lessons were learned to continually identify good practice. 

Our review of incident investigation reports showed areas for learning and improvement were identified and action plans developed. 

Staff said there was a good culture for reporting incidents, they knew what incidents to report and how to report them. Staff were debriefed and received support following serious incidents. Managers were responsible for investigating incidents and leaders shared learning, themes and trends with staff at meetings. At our 2018 inspection we found that investigations into incidents were sometimes delayed. At this assessment we found that investigation timelines were monitored by the division as part of governance processes and the incidents we reviewed had been investigated in a timely way. 

Monthly newsletters were shared with staff, detailing any trends and shared learning from incidents. We saw that themes and trends were identified as part of learning reviews. This included medicines incidents, falls, pressure ulcers and incidents of violence and aggression. However, we did find an incident of violence and aggression that related to a patient with poor mental health categorised only as being an incident of violence and aggression. This meant there was limited consideration of the incident from a patient safety perspective, which may have limited the review of contributing factors. 

Trust policies and procedures provided staff with guidance for reporting, managing, investigating, and learning from incidents. We saw that the trust used the National Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF) and there was a focus on learning from incidents.  There had been 6 serious incidents in the last 12 months. The trust had a duty of candour (DoC) policy in line with legislation. Staff understood duty of candour and were open and transparent, giving patients and families full explanations if things went wrong.

Morbidity and mortality (MM) meetings were used to identify learning from deaths and implement actions to improve practice. Staff told us mortality reviews were discussed at monthly governance meetings and recommendations were implemented when required.

However, actions to improve were not always consistently implemented. For example, we reviewed an incident that identified patients waiting for prolonged periods did not always have repeat observations. Audits showed a continued inconsistency of repeat observations and our findings during the assessment reflected this.

Safe systems, pathways and transitions

Score: 1

We scored the service as 1. The evidence showed significant shortfalls.  The service did not work well with people and health system partners to establish and maintain safe systems of care. They did not manage or monitor people’s safety. They did not make sure there was continuity of care, including when people moved between different services.

There were not clear and effective arrangements in place to support the safe assessment and treatment of children and young people who presented as walk-in patients to the emergency department. Paediatric emergency department (ED) services at Eastbourne Hospital accepted walk-in patients only. The trust had an agreement with the ambulance service that children and young people requiring emergency care would be conveyed to Conquest Hospital. However, the service did not have clearly documented exclusion criteria setting out which paediatric patients could be safely assessed and treated at Eastbourne District General Hospital and which should be directed elsewhere.

There was dedicated paediatric medical cover during the day, however, there was a reduced paediatric service overnight with paediatric medical cover provided remotely from the paediatric consultant at Conquest Hospital. Children and young people attending the department were cared for by paediatric nurses during the day. However, at night they were cared for by general nurses, some of whom had paediatric competencies. Completion of paediatric competencies was inconsistent and therefore not guaranteed. There was no clear exclusion criteria for children and young people attending the emergency department. This, together with limited on-site paediatric medical and nursing cover meant it was not clear how the trust assured itself that the needs of all children and young people presenting as walk-in patients could be safely met. Data provided by the trust showed that 132 children and young people were transferred from Eastbourne District General Hospital to Conquest Hospital between October and December 2025. The trust did not monitor or collect data on whether these transfers required a children’s nurse escort. This presented a risk of understaffing, potentially compromising safety. 

On arrival to the emergency department patients arriving by ambulance were streamed by the nurse in charge then triaged by a dedicated triage nurse.  Patients self presenting were triaged on arrival. Patients were triaged using a recognised triage system. Triage data showed that overall average time from arrival to triage between October and December 2025 was between 16 and 18 minutes, with improvements noted each month. This was against a national target of 15 minutes. At the time of our assessment the average time to triage was within target at 12 minutes. Time to triage for patients arriving by ambulance was 17 minutes 28 seconds in December 2025 and 23 minutes 23 seconds in January 2026. 

The service had been using an electronic triaging system, which had been suspended at the time of our assessment due to ongoing changes within the department. A manual triage system had been implemented but we found issues with the quality of triage and gaps in processes. Triage assessments observed were brief and inconsistent with recognised triage standards. Safeguarding questions, allergy status, pain scoring and offers of analgesia were not reliably undertaken or documented. Staff reported that while an initial set of observations was taken for all patients, re-assessment of observations in the waiting room was inconsistent. In addition, we found that older people, patients with cognitive impairment, and those in significant pain were directed to the waiting room without documented evidence they were clinically suitable for that environment.

There were policies and escalation plans to manage increased pressures on the service for the transfer of patients to a point of care as quickly as possible. We observed sustained pressure and crowding within the department. By late morning on the first day of our visit, the waiting room was standing room only, and staff told us 20 patients were waiting to be admitted under medical teams. Leaders told us the main cause of delays was a lack of medical beds.

Although patients were triaged soon after arrival, there were long waiting times whilst waiting for ongoing assessment or treatment. The service allocated bank clinical support workers to shifts in the waiting room, however, this shift was not always covered. We observed prolonged periods where no nursing or clinical support worker presence was visible within the waiting room.

Arrangements for assessing and streaming patients on arrival by ambulance did not ensure patients received safe care.  There was no functioning rapid assessment area. The area designed and dedicated for rapid assessment had been repurposed for majors capacity. There was no focus on providing early senior clinical assessment in line with rapid assessment guidelines.

Ambulance patients were registered and streamed by the nurse in charge, based on handover information received by ambulance staff in majors. They did not necessarily see the patient at this point, therefore, patients were not always seen by emergency department staff before the clinical space was chosen. Ambulance staff transferred patients to the chosen clinical space directly without emergency department staff having sight of them. These patients were then not reviewed again until a separate member of the nursing team reassessed them and completed the triage tool and observations. This meant there was a possible missed opportunity to identify the potential for deterioration, particularly during times of peak demand.  

Ambulance offload processes were variable which impacted on the safety and flow within the department. The second triage nurse was frequently redeployed from triage to manage ambulance corridor patients, leaving triage under-resourced. Rapid assessment areas were used as additional capacity where patients were cared for, rather than for rapid assessment. Emergency department consultants were not routinely engaged in assessment or flow decisions. There was limited communication between the nurse in charge and the consultant in charge. The nurse in charge was not included in clinical handover. There was no discussion of operations as part of the clinical handover. 

We raised concerns with the trust about patient safety and flow within the department. They provided a plan that included the implementation of rapid assessment processes in line with NHSE guidance. Their plans included the implementation of rapid assessment documentation, the identification of senior decision makers and improved focus on ambulance and high acuity walk in patients. There were also plans to strengthen same-day emergency care pathways to improve patient flow. This included co-locating the nurse in charge and the emergency physician in charge to ensure regular joint board rounds, situation reports, and the identification of risks, long waits, and escalating concerns.

Liaison Psychiatric Services (LPS) were not co located within the emergency department. There was a service level agreement to deliver 24-hour psychiatric liaison, 7 days a week. There was a dedicated LPS phone line for ED staff to refer patients experiencing poor mental health, with an aim of assessing patients within an hour of referral. December 2025 data showed that none of the 9 patients referred to LPS were assessed within an hour. All 9 patients waited between 3 and 10 hours for an assessment. 

There was no Mental Health (MH) frequent attender pathway, and patients were triaged and treated as routine. ED staff liaised with staff from the local mental health trust to remotely share care plans and information. There was no dedicated Child and adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) input onsite, the provision for this was at Conquest hospital in Hastings. Where a face-to-face CAMHS assessment was required, the patient was transferred or would have a virtual assessment. There was a risk of treatment and admission delay where an inpatient bed may be needed. 

We were told the Mental Health lead had implemented a daily bed flow meeting and joint weekly caseload meeting with the local mental health trust, to review patients waiting for a mental health bed. We were also told that a protocol for ensuring patients with poor mental health did not stay for longer than 24 hours was in place and that patients were admitted to a bed if they were in the department for this long. However, we observed a patient that had been in the department for more than 24 hours. 

Safeguarding

Score: 3

The evidence showed a good standard. The service worked with people and healthcare partners to understand what being safe meant to them and the best way to achieve that. They concentrated on improving people’s lives while protecting their right to live in safety, free from bullying, harassment, abuse, discrimination, avoidable harm and neglect. The service shared concerns quickly and appropriately.

The trust’s safeguarding policies and procedures referenced national and local guidance, with clear actions for staff in the event they were concerned a patient had been subject to abuse. Staff told us they understood how to raise safeguarding concerns and that they were supported to do so. Safeguarding referrals were sent to the local authority, and regular meetings were held to identify issues and trends. 

Safeguarding training for all staff working with people at risk was aligned to national guidance and monitored through the trust’s governance framework. Staff said they received training and knew how to escalate concerns and access support from safeguarding leads when appropriate. Staff were   compliant for Level 2 child safeguarding. However, not all emergency department staff were up to date with Level 2 adults training (85%) and Level 3 ‘think family’ training (86%). We saw that level 3 training for specific resuscitation and advanced clinical practitioners was 75%.  The trust training target was 90%. 

Staff followed safe procedures for children visiting the service. Staff told us they could escalate concerns when they needed to. They told us the safeguarding team were accessible and supportive. Staff checked the trust’s system for safeguarding alerts and were confident to contact their matron or safeguarding team if they had concerns. 

Staff were offered de-brief sessions by the team when dealing with complex cases and safeguarding supervision was available to support staff to reflect on their practice. 

There were recruitment processes to ensure all staff had an up-to-date enhanced disclosure and barring service (DBS) check and, where applicable, had kept their professional registration up to date. 

There were policies to guide staff on the use of restraint and restriction to ensure they were used appropriately. The use of restraint was understood and monitored, and less restrictive options were used where possible. The security team worked through preventative methods before using restraint and provided training for frontline staff. 

Involving people to manage risks

Score: 2

The evidence showed some shortfalls. The service did not always work well with people to understand and manage risks. Staff did not always provide care to meet people’s needs that was safe, supportive and enabled people to do the things that mattered to them. 

Patient risks were not always identified in the waiting room. The visual monitoring and oversight of patients was not effective as the layout of the room made it difficult for staff to safely observe patients. Service leads could not provide robust observation audit data on observations undertaken in the waiting room because staff recorded this information on paper records. As a result, leaders could not easily analyse data, identify gaps in practice or gain assurance that staff completed observations consistently and in line with local procedures. Patients were triaged back to the waiting room, having had an initial set of observations, but not always subsequent ones. 

We were told there was a dedicated clinical support worker shift to provide oversight of the waiting room and oversee patients waiting there. However, we were told these shifts were only filled 50% of the time. During our assessment we did not see intentional observations of the waiting room or audits of any observation tool used. We did not see a clinical support worker assigned to this area during our visit. There was limited oversight by clinical leads. 

Patients were not seen in order of clinical priority. Patients were seen predominantly in time order, rather than based on the assessment of their needs. Triage observations and records were not always completed in line with the triage system requirements. We were told that one of the triage nurses was regularly removed from triage duties to manage ambulance queues when these formed. 

Staff did not consistently record key information at triage.  Within the records we reviewed there was no documentation within triage of allergies, no documentation of pain score or if analgesia was offered, no record of past medical history, or clinical red flags (red flags are signs of potential deterioration requiring prompt evaluation).

Once triaged, escalation to a clinician relied entirely on nursing staff. While triage scores were recorded, these were not used to prioritise patients from a clinical or operational perspective. The triage tool was not used by the nurse or consultant in charge to coordinate flow. Patients were not screened or ordered by clinical priority.

Staff used the National Early Warning Score (a nationally recognised tool to identify deteriorating patients for appropriate escalation). There was an escalation process if a patient showed signs of deterioration. For example, there was national guidance directing how quickly patients should receive treatment for sepsis based on their presentation. External (SAMBA25) audit data showed that 69.2% of Eastbourne ED patients had an early warning score calculated within 30 minutes of arrival compared with 73.1% nationally. This indicated that staff did not consistently complete timely assessments to identify patients at risk of deterioration.

We saw that time critical medicines were not always identified. For example, we saw a patient that had been in the department for over 10 hours who had not had medications, including insulin for their diabetes, prescribed.

Staff told us issues with sepsis screening and the recognition of deterioration had been identified by the trust following an incident. Monthly audits were undertaken and results showed that all adult patients had been appropriately screened. However, appropriate actions were inconsistent. For example, in October 2025 only 70% of relevant patients had been administered antibiotics within an hour in line with sepsis guidance. The trust was taking some action to improve. This included increasing sepsis audits to 40 records monthly from 10. However, there was evidence of risk to sepsis screening and treatment processes due to the lack of repeat observations for ambulatory patients. 

Observations following triage were often undertaken at 4 to 6-hourly intervals, aligning with inpatient standards rather than Emergency Department standards. As a result, patients could wait up to 6 hours for a second set of observations, regardless of their initial NEWS2 score. This increased the risk of unrecognised deterioration. 

Patients were largely seen in time order, and prioritisation was not always driven by clinical risk or NEWS2 scores. This increased the risk of delays in assessment, treatment and intervention for patients with urgent or deteriorating conditions. We reviewed 10 sets of patient records. Documentation of pressure area care, frailty scoring, and nutritional assessment was undertaken. These assessments were recorded within the electronic record. However, in the patient records we reviewed 2 patients over the age of 75 had not had a falls risk assessment carried out in line with national guidance. 

We raised concerns with the trust about the lack of oversight in the waiting room. In response, the trust provided an action plan with a clear timeframe. This included increased observations, dedicated consultant and nurse oversight, and prioritising patients based on individual risk and need rather than how long they had been in the department.

Patients with poor mental health were reviewed by liaison psychiatry staff. We observed verbal handover from by Liaison Psychiatry staff to ED staff, however, there was inconsistent documentation of mental health assessments within the electronic patient record system. Entries were sometimes brief and did not reflect a full assessment of the patient and any risks. This was a repeated concern as we identified issues with a lack of risk assessment at our previous inspection. 

We saw staff conducting 1 to 1 observations of patients with poor mental health where there were identified risks relating to potential harm to self or others. We saw a patient had been recommended for admission to a local mental health trust; however, the records did not clearly state the rationale or timing of this decision. We saw that risks had been identified but there was not a clear plan to mitigate or manage the risks in relation to a potential delayed admission.  

Safe environments

Score: 2

The evidence showed some shortfalls. The service did not always detect and control potential risks in the care environment. They did not always make sure equipment, facilities and technology supported the delivery of safe care.

The emergency department was clearly signposted. The main ambulatory waiting room had limited seating and was frequently overcrowded. The room was away from staff areas as reception was around a corner, presenting difficulties with oversight and monitoring, and a potential risk to patient safety. There was poor line of sight of the waiting room from staff areas. The waiting room had wi-fi access and refreshment machines. There was a separate children’s waiting room, but this was very small and we regularly saw children waiting in the main adult area. 

The service did not ensure patients were cared for in a safe and appropriate environment. When the department was crowded patients were cared for in areas not designed for prolonged stays, where appropriate facilities such as access to showers were not available.

Not all facilities and premises were appropriate for the service being delivered. The department did not have sufficient cubicle capacity to meet patient demand. As a result, patients were cared for in areas that were not designed to accommodate longer stays or support the delivery of ongoing care. Staff completed an incident report whenever these areas were utilised. 

The service used 'super surge' bedded areas within the majors and treatment areas during periods of high demand. Although the service had completed risk assessments for these areas, the environment did not consistently support safe patient care. These beds were located in walkthrough areas in majors and the rapid assessment area and just in front of nursing stations. Patients in some surge areas did not have access to call bells and relied on staff noticing them to request assistance. This increased the risk that patients could not promptly raise concerns or seek help if their condition deteriorated.

The department made use of non-clinical escalation areas, including corridor beds, ‘super-surge’ spaces next to desks and walls, the ambulance offload corridor and an orthopaedic waiting room which was used as a quieter space for patients. However, these areas were not visible from the main ED. This increased the risk that staff did not identify deteriorating patients promptly and reduced staffing in other areas when staff were required to provide observation and oversight.  Risk assessments were undertaken on all ‘super-surge’ spaces, and we saw that mitigations were in place. For example, by sourcing additional staff and equipment for corridor care. We saw corridor care during our assessment and saw staff using portable equipment.

Children and young people were seen in a paediatric area that had limited capacity. While we were on site we saw children waiting in the adult waiting room due to the limited space. Children were required to wait in adult areas due to insufficient capacity within the designated paediatric area. This was not in line with the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health (RCPCH) Facing the Future: Standards for Children and Young People in Emergency Care, which states that urgent and emergency care settings should be designed with sufficient capacity to accommodate anticipated numbers of children and young people, including flexibility to manage surges in demand. The standards also state that, in departments treating both adults and children, the design and layout should ensure that the needs of both groups are equitably served.

The department had a dedicated mental health assessment room designed with features to support patient safety during assessment. However, we observed a patient trolley had been placed in the room with bed linen on, which presented a potential ligature risk to patients. We informed service leads and the trolley was removed. The mental health assessment room was situated near the main entrance to the emergency department, it offered easy visibility from the nurses’ station, however it was observed to be very stimulating. This meant the area could be noisy, busy, or distracting, which may increase anxiety or distress for patients during their assessment.

There were staff and patient movements and high noise levels, which could be potentially unsettling for patients with neurodiversity or those acutely psychotic. Staff told us they were aware of the limitations of the area and had worked hard to make the environment as inclusive and safe as possible. 

The ambulatory and majors treatment areas were crowded during our visit. We saw the waiting room did not have enough space or seating to meet demand, which meant some people were standing while waiting to be seen. The major’s treatment area was visibly clean with hand wash basins and sufficient supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) available for staff. There were fire evacuation plans displayed on the walls and fire risk assessments were carried out.

Staff told us that clinical equipment was generally available when they needed it. They identified when equipment required testing and electrical appliance checks were due. Equipment we checked was within the required testing timeframe. However, staff reported to us there were issues with insufficient computers and handheld devices, and issues with software which impacted their access to patient records. 

Safe and effective staffing

Score: 1

The evidence showed significant shortfalls. The service did not always make sure there were enough qualified, skilled and experienced staff. They did not have sufficient paediatric medical and nursing staff with the right qualifications, skills and training to keep children and young people safe from avoidable harm and to provide the right care and treatment. The mandatory training target was not consistently met for all modules. 

At our inspection in 2018 we found that the department was not meeting the trust’s 90% achievement target for mandatory training. At this assessment we found that not all staff were up to date with mandatory training. The mandatory training target was 90% and we saw this was not always achieved. For example, falls prevention training was at 76%, and achievement of basic life support training was well below target at 70% overall for the department. We were also told that not all resuscitation practitioners had up to date intermediate or advanced life support adult or paediatric life support training. This included 2 practitioners who did not have current adult or paediatric training and 2 who did not have paediatric training. Leaders told us this had been due to staffing issues, and we saw that some practitioners had been booked onto training in the coming weeks.  

The vacancy rate for emergency department additional clinical services was 17.9 whole time equivalent (WTE) posts within emergency care. This included clinical support worker and navigator posts. The overall vacancy rate for nursing (and midwifery) registered staff was 17.4 WTE.  This was mitigated by the trust with the use of bank and agency registered nurses.  During our assessment we saw that a particular area of impact was on oversight of the waiting room. We were told that a clinical support worker role was allocated to the waiting room, however, this was only filled 50% of the time. We saw both unfilled medical and nursing shifts over the 2 days of our assessment. However, we also saw cover had been planned and that absences were due to short term sickness within the department. We saw that staff were moved from different areas of the department to provide cover and that sometimes staff were moved from other hospital areas to support shortages. There were regular rounds and huddles where staffing was discussed with input from leads across the hospital.

We observed emergency physician in charge cover for 16 hours a day and there was 24-hour consultant cover. There were 9 consultants in total, plus 2 locum consultants, with 2 vacancies. We were told that vacant consultant posts had been recruited to, with one due to start shortly. There were 17 middle grade doctors, with 2 vacancies, which were being recruited to. Some staff said there was good medical cover and an adequate mix of staff, while others said there were sometimes gaps in staffing, impacted by short term sickness. Clinicians told us there was very good multidisciplinary working within the department and good relationships with colleagues across the trust. The urgent treatment centre (UTC) was run by the trust and staffed by emergency nurse practitioners and GPs. It was co-located on site within the emergency department.

The trust website stated that ‘Eastbourne DGH provides urgent care for paediatric cases in the emergency department (ED) and urgent treatment centre, staffed by Advanced Paediatric Nurse Practitioners’. Some leads told us the paediatric provision was for urgent treatment rather than emergency care. However, there was no clear exclusion criteria for walk in patients. Staffing was not in line with Facing the Future: Standards for Children and Young People (CYP) in Emergency Care’. For example, there were no dedicated paediatric emergency medical consultants with dedicated clinical and non-clinical time allocated to paediatric emergency care. There was no dedicated medical cover out of hours and at weekends. All EDs treating CYP must have at least two registered children’s nurses on each shift, and at least one nurse with an advanced paediatric life support qualification. During our assessment we saw nurse staffing did not always meet this requirement, for example, we saw there were 15 occasions over a 3-month period where there was only 1 registered children’s nurse on shift. 

We saw there had been 132 children and young people admissions to Conquest Hospital from Eastbourne ED attendances over a 3-month period between October and December 2025. We asked the service to provide us with information on how many of these transfers required a nurse escort, however, they told us they did not collect that information. This meant they were unable to demonstrate the impact of regular transfers on the staffing of the service. 

Infection prevention and control

Score: 2

The evidence showed some shortfalls. The service did not always assess or manage the risk of infection. They did not always detect and control the risk of it spreading or share concerns with appropriate agencies promptly.

At our 2018 inspection we found there were variable infection prevention and control standards and inconsistent infection, prevention and control (IPC) assessments. At this assessment we found the trust’s IPC policy guided staff to minimise the risk of infection to patients, staff and visitors. Infection control precautions were available for staff on the trust’s intranet. IPC assessments were regularly undertaken; however, staff did not always follow good IPC processes.

Staff were not always bare below the elbow. We saw staff wearing long sleeves while undertaking clinical activities. This meant staff could not clean their hands and wrists effectively. 

The department’s cleanliness audits for the year showed monthly compliance in line with the national standards of healthcare cleanliness. Hand hygiene audits monitored staff compliance with national guidance and trust policy for handwashing. Data provided showed high compliance. Overall cleaning compliance was shown to be 97% in January 2026.

Emergency department staff had mostly completed the required mandatory training in infection prevention and control, however the trust’s mandatory training target of 90% had not been met. Overall, 81% of staff had completed IPC training. This was at 100% for both advanced clinical practitioners and resuscitation practitioners. 

We saw sharps bins (for the disposal of used needles) were safely closed when not in use and were labelled correctly in line with guidance. We observed staff using clinical and healthcare waste bins correctly.

We identified potential infection control issues during our assessment. For example, a patient with flu symptoms remained within a full waiting room due to lack of isolation or capacity in majors. The paediatric area had no running water. We were told this had been reported and parts for a repair had been ordered. However, we observed wet towels on the floor under the basin. 

We identified a maintenance issue in the paediatric area, where the clinical handwashing sink did not have running water. This meant staff could not wash their hands at the sink in line with infection prevention and control practices. However, we observed alcohol-based hand rub was available and accessible for staff to use. Staff told us they had reported the issue, were awaiting replacement parts and confirmed the repair was completed shortly after our assessment.

At our previous inspection, we identified concerns about the management of patients with infectious conditions due to limited isolation facilities. During this assessment, we did not observe these issues and received no reports of concerns relating to the isolation of patients.

Medicines optimisation

Score: 2

The evidence showed some shortfalls. The service did not always make sure that medicines and treatments were safe and met people’s needs, capacities and preferences. They did not always involve people in planning.

Medical gases were not managed safely or securely. We saw full, empty and in use medical gas cylinders were stored together in a corridor without adequate signage. We saw that piped medical air outlets were not always managed in line with national patient safety alerts. There was a risk patients would not receive oxygen as prescribed. 

The service had policies and processes for the secure storage of medicines including controlled drugs and medical gases. However, we identified concerns with the management of stock medicines as we saw medicines that were out of date or lacked date opened or in-use expiry dates. Stock medicines were routinely kept by a hospital ward or department; processes were also in place for staff to obtain medicines used less frequently and not kept as stock. 

People in the department were not always supported to take their own medicines. When people did not have the ability to manage their own medicines, there was no clear process for safely storing them. For example, staff told us that they were not aware of the service's policy for managing patients' own medicines. The emergency department did not have pharmacy support in line with national guidance produced by the Royal College of Emergency Medicines (RCEM). Therefore, risk-based pharmacy support was not available to undertake medicines reconciliation (the process of identifying an accurate list of a patient's current medicine) for patients awaiting admission to the wards, support the identification of patients in ED taking time critical medicines or had complex medicines regimes. Nor to undertake clinical screening of discharge prescriptions and support the timely transfer of information to the patient’s GP and community pharmacy. 

We reviewed recent trust data for omitted doses and time critical medicines. Omitted doses are prescribed doses of medicines that are omitted for various reasons. Time critical medicines are those where the patient could become unwell if the medicines are omitted or administered late. The time critical medicines data indicated that whilst most prescribed time critical medicines were administered close to the prescribed time, not all were administered in a timely manner. In addition, we observed a situation where a patient requiring insulin had not had this prescribed for more than 10 hours while in the department. Non prescribing of time critical medicines meant that people could be at risk of poorer medicines related outcomes.

Staff supplied over labelled medicines against emergency department prescriptions and via patient group directions (PGDs). Over-labelled medicines are those that have been labelled with pre-printed instructions, like dosage information, on top of the original packaging. The department had adequate stock of appropriately over-labelled packs.

Nurses were authorised to administer and supply medicines via an approved list of PGDs. The trust provided guidance to staff to support the record keeping of controlled drugs and controlled stationery. Staff followed trust guidance in relation to controlled drugs and some, but not all, controlled stationery.