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Devon Partnership NHS Trust

This is an organisation that runs the health and social care services we inspect

Overall: Good read more about inspection ratings
Important:

We served a warning notice on Devon Partnership NHS Trust on 5 June 2025 as the quality of health care provided needs significant improvements in Forensic inpatient or secure ward services at Langdon Hospital.

Assessment report published 12 November 2026

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Safe

Requires improvement

9 November 2026

This means we looked for evidence that people were protected from abuse and avoidable harm.


At our last inspection we rated this key question good. At this inspection the rating has changed to requires improvement. We found 7 breaches of the regulations. At the time of our inspection, patients detained in the HBPoS did not have access to fresh air. The HBPoS was being used for seclusion though it was not intended for this purpose and contained a door hinge which was known to pose a risk of ligature. Patients detained in the HBPoS in ‘admission beds’ did not have access to single sex facilities. The Exeter and East and Mid Devon crisis resolution and home treatment teams’ (CRHTTs) offices were not suitable for the teams to safely deliver care and treatment. The service did not always make sure that medicines and treatments were safe and met people’s needs, capacities and preferences, and physical health check completion was inconsistent. There were not always enough suitably trained staff and they did not always receive supervision in line with trust policy.


However, staff assessed and managed risks to people who used services and themselves well. The service managed patient safety incidents well and usually learnt lessons to identify and embed good practice.

The score of 1 for the quality statements 'Safe Environments', 'Safe and Effective Staffing', and 'Medicines Optimisation', limits the overall key question rating to requires improvement.

This service scored 50 (out of 100) for this area. Find out what we look at when we assess this area and How we calculate these scores.

Learning culture

Score: 3

The service had a proactive and positive culture of safety, based on openness and honesty. They listened to concerns about safety and investigated and reported safety events. Lessons were learnt to continually identify and embed good practice.


The trust had policies and procedures in place, and all staff knew what incidents to report and how to report them. Some staff told us examples of incidents they had reported, such as safeguarding concerns, or when the First Response Service (FRS) was unable to make contact with other trust services when necessary for patient care. Managers had access to systems which provided information for action and analysis. Incidents that met the criteria for further investigation were reviewed in patient safety incident investigations (PSIIs) using the NHS Patient Safety Incident Response Framework (PSIRF). PSIRF is the NHS approach to developing and maintaining effective systems and processes for responding to patient safety incidents for the purposes of learning and improving patient safety.


The trust provided detailed examples of PSIIs it had conducted and there was evidence that changes had been made as a result. For example, we saw that the Adult Directorate Leadership was revising the discharge planning section of the crisis resolution and home treatment team (CRHTT) standard operating procedures (SOPs) directly because of learning from PSIIs.
Staff told us that incidents were discussed in team meetings and huddles, with learning cascaded through meetings and emails. They also told us they were personally debriefed after incidents they were directly involved in and that management offered appropriate support.


The trust told us there were 2 serious incidents where the outcome was an ‘unexpected, unnatural death’ across the service in the last 12 months. Both of these were at Teignbridge CRHTT, and investigation reports were in progress, however one report with a due date of 8 February 2026 was overdue, and an investigation status update said the revised expected completion date was in April 2026. The other report related to an incident that had occurred in October 2025 and had a due date in April 2026. The investigation status update said that the report had been completed and was going through trust sign off processes.


The trust provided data for the number of patient safety incidents while people were on a community waiting list. This data included incidents in the HBPoS and Liaison Psychiatry, as well as community mental health teams, and we were unable to break the data down by individual teams. Between March 2025 and February 2026, the trust reported there had been 105 patient safety incidents. Of these, 7 were categorised as ‘catastrophic’, 1 as ‘Major Impact’, 5 as ‘Moderate’, 48 as ‘Minor’ and 43 as ‘Near Miss,’ or ‘No Harm’. ‘Catastrophic’ incidents meant someone had died. Of the 7 deaths reported by the trust, 6 were unexpected, unnatural deaths, with 2 of these being suspected suicide, and 1 was an expected unnatural death. One of the 105 incidents had not been assigned a category in the data we received. The most common categories were ‘safeguarding’ with 25 incidents, and ‘self-harm’ with 22 incidents. The trust provided data for the number of patient incidents while people were waiting for a bed. Between March 2025 and February 2026, there were 35 incidents for the HBPoS, 8 for CRHTTs, and zero for FRS. The service had recorded no ‘never events’ in the 12 months prior to our inspection. Never events are defined as wholly preventable patient safety events.


Staff and managers understood their responsibilities regarding the duty of candour. The duty of candour is a legal obligation for healthcare providers to be open and honest with people who use services, or their families, when something goes wrong with their care or treatment and causes harm or has the potential to cause harm. Staff and managers were open and transparent and gave people who used services and families a full explanation if and when things went wrong. The trust provided data that showed they had a system to monitor the numbers of duty of candour incidents and there had been 18 incidents in the 12 months prior to our inspection. Of these, 10 duty of candour incidents were at FRS, 4 were at Teignbridge CRHTT, and South and West Devon, East and Mid Devon, North Devon, and Exeter CRHTTs had 1 each. The trust provided examples of recent duty of candour incidents, where investigations had looked at handovers between CMHTs and CRHTTs, staff knowledge of processes such as the FRS triage process, and notes not being completed to provide assurance of a risk assessment being done.


A service manager showed us a positive example of a duty of candour event and after-action review conducted by a team manager. We saw that the team manager had handled the situation sensitively, maintained regular contact with the family throughout, and involved them wherever possible. The trust’s risk team had noted the very high standard of the team manager’s work, and the example was being taken forward to the service’s ‘learning from experience’ meeting to share the learning from the incident with colleagues.

Safe systems, pathways and transitions

Score: 2

Staff at all levels told us that insufficient inpatient beds had a negative impact on the services we inspected. However, the service worked with people and healthcare partners to establish and maintain safe systems of care, in which safety was managed or monitored. They made sure there was continuity of care, including when people moved between different services.
We asked the trust to provide the last 12 months of audits for the HBPoS, including reasons for extended stays, and number of breaches of 24 or 36 hours, including total length of stay in the HBPoS. The trust told us they did not audit this data and could not provide the information. The trust risk register said that between December 2022 and December 2023 there were approximately 2 patients per week detained to the HBPoS on section 2 or 3 of the Mental Health act. The risk register stated that this had become established practice due to the lack of inpatient beds, and the delays usually lasted for several days with some cases lasting over a week.
The CRHTTs and HBPoS accepted referrals from anyone over the age of 18. The service’s referral and admission processes ensured that all essential information about the person was received to determine if their needs could safely be met. Staff from FRS provided an initial screening and triage of all referrals by telephone to determine whether a full assessment was required. Staff would signpost people to other services if they were not in a crisis, such as third-sector organisations. CRHTTs held responsibility for gatekeeping, which is the assessment of whether a person requires inpatient care or can be safely and appropriately treated in the community. If a person required inpatient care, CRHTTs held responsibility for securing this through regular, trust wide bed management meetings.
The FRS delivered a 24/7 all-age urgent mental health crisis service and went live with NHS 111 Mental Health Crisis Option 2 telephone calls in October 2025. The service accepted referrals from a wide range of sources including self-referrals, family and carers. The trust operated a separate ‘professionals’ line available for GPs, police, ambulance, NHS 111, third-sector agencies and other professionals involved in supporting a person in their care journey. Staff told us that FRS management attended regular police and ambulance services liaison meetings where any concerns could be raised.
The CRHTT standard operating procedure (SOP) had a process for reviewing patients who did not or could not engage with the service. This included a range of options including telephone calls to the person, visiting their home, contacting the police or formulating multi-agency plans, where appropriate. Staff and leaders told us the service was impacted by insufficient availability of inpatient beds and this regularly led to delays for people needing Mental Health Act assessments, and that CRHTTs felt they were managing more risk on their caseloads as a result. There was a clear beds management process, with daily meetings to discuss people’s needs and allocate inpatient beds appropriately. The service was able to access the trust’s crisis house provision

Safeguarding

Score: 3

The service worked with people and healthcare partners to understand what being safe meant to them and the best way to achieve that. They concentrated on improving people’s lives while protecting their right to live in safety, free from bullying, harassment, abuse, discrimination, avoidable harm and neglect. The service shared concerns quickly and appropriately.
The service met regularly with healthcare partners at safeguarding adults meetings. Meetings were attended by a broad range of partners including local county councils, emergency services, and probation services. We reviewed meeting minutes and saw that a trust attendee was present at these meetings.


Staff and managers told us they knew how to identify adults and children at risk of, or suffering, significant harm. Staff were able to clearly explain the process to follow if they had any safeguarding concerns, and we saw they had easy access to safeguarding information. We observed and staff gave us examples of how they found and appropriately managed safeguarding concerns. For example, we heard how a CRHTT team had worked closely with a safeguarding lead and children’s services to escalate, manage and progress concerns around a complex case. The trust safeguarding lead was commended from multiple staff members across all teams as being ‘supportive’ and ‘outstanding’. We also saw evidence in an FRS record of a safeguarding concern being discussed with professionals and staff then raised an appropriate referral following trust policy. We observed a handover meeting where the CRHTT thoroughly explored a safeguarding concern for a person using services, from multiple professional perspectives.


Staff completed an incident report when they found a safeguarding concern. In the 12 months prior to our inspection, the service had recorded 72 potential concerns which had been logged as safeguarding incidents in the trust’s incidents recording system. Of these, 46 resulted in referrals to local authorities’ adult safeguarding team. A further 23 resulted in referrals to local authorities’ child safeguarding teams.


In January 2026, all teams had over 90% compliance for both Safeguarding Adults and Safeguarding Children training. Four teams had teams achieved 100% compliance; these were North Devon, South Hams and West Devon, Teignbridge and Torbay CRHTTs.

Involving people to manage risks

Score: 2

The service did not always work well with people to understand and manage risks. They did not always provide care to meet people’s needs that was safe, supportive and enabled people to do the things that mattered to them. Care records did not always fully meet the trust’s expected standards for risk assessments.


We reviewed 14 care records, including risk assessments and risk management plans, across the CRHTTs and 3 from FRS. Most risk assessments were present and completed to a good level, updated regularly and appropriate risk management plans were in place. However, we found that 1 CRHTT risk management plan was not present, and 3 other records, though present, were lacking in detail. Most risk assessments and safety plans were regularly reviewed and updated. Staff told us they involved people who used the service and their family members or carers in care planning and risk assessments. The initial mental health crisis intervention plan completed at assessment included details on how to contact services when needed and what to do if risk escalated.


Managers completed regular audits of care records and shared the results with the team and with specific individuals when improvements were required. The trust provided data for the Quality Review of Care Records (QRCR) audits from March 2025 to February 2026, which showed that 73% of CRHTT care records fully met, 26% partially met, and 1% did not meet the expected standard for risk assessments. The trust had introduced a core care records improvement project in January 2025, which was a three-phase project aiming to produce a core care record structure that would support effective care and maintain standards. There had been 8 workshops focusing on the core care record items, such as discharge summaries, assessment and formulation. A CRHTT representative had attended 4 of the 8 workshops. There had also been 11 clinical orientation sessions for the project, however none of these had been attended by a CRHTT or FRS representative.


Staff participated in some clinical audit and quality improvement initiatives. For example, at FRS, results from the Quality Review of Clinical Records (QRCR) process found that the team had consistently low completion rates for some questions within the electronic patient record (EPR) system. The FRS team were then involved in redesigning the questions at the time of our inspection, to achieve improved completion rates.


In the HBPoS, staff told us they only used restraint when necessary. At the time of our inspection, 100% of staff were compliant with restraint training, and 90.5% were compliant in conflict resolution training. Staff in the HBPoS told us they used de-escalation techniques to reduce the need for physical interventions when patients’ behaviours became heightened. The trust provided data showing that in the 6 months prior to our inspection, there had been 32 instances of physical restraint. Of these, 4 instances of restraint were in the prone position, which meant they were held face-down. Physical restraint is the use of direct physical contact by staff to prevent, restrict or subdue a person’s movement, or movement of part of their body. This may include holding a person to prevent them from harming themselves or others. National guidance states that prone restraint should be avoided wherever possible. The trust had a restrictive interventions policy which reflected this guidance. The trust provided meeting minutes from an Acute Inpatient Local Delivery Unit (LDU) meeting in January 2026, which included oversight of the HBPoS. Prone restraints had been noted in the meeting minutes, and a review of 6 recent restraint incidents had been started to assess adherence to policy and proportionality, with findings to be presented at the next meeting. It was unclear from meeting minutes whether this included the HBPoS or not.


HBPoS staff told us they were trained in working with people experiencing distress and they completed competency training in observation skills and the prevention, understanding and management of aggression (PUMA). The data showed there had been 5 instances of rapid tranquilisation in the 6 months prior to our inspection. Rapid tranquillisation is the administration of medication to rapidly calm or lightly sedate a person experiencing severe agitation or behavioural disturbance where there is an immediate risk of harm to the person or others. We saw that reducing restrictive practice, including a review of incidents of restraint, seclusions and rapid tranquilisation, was a regular agenda item at LDU Governance meetings.

Safe environments

Score: 1

The service did not always detect and control potential risks in the care and working environments. They did not always make sure facilities and technology supported the delivery of safe care.
At the time of our last inspection in 2017, the trust had 3 HBPoS locations and we were told they were planning to refurbish them. Our previous inspection report in 2017 stated that the trust should ensure its planned refurbishment of the HBPoS maintained people’s safety and privacy. It also stated that the trust should have a system which would allow people who used the HBPOS to access outside areas without the risk of people absconding.
At this inspection, the trust had 1 health-based place of safety (HBPoS) located at Wonford House in Exeter which contained 3 beds. There was a separate assessment room available, and there was a small clinic room where medicines were stored, with a bag containing resuscitation equipment for use in an emergency. A locked safe storage area was available for patients’ possessions to be stored safely. Emergency resuscitation grab bags and ligature cutters were stored nearby to ensure easy access in the event of an emergency.
The trust told us that due to a lack of inpatient beds across the trust, the HBPoS was regularly used for ‘admission beds’ for detained patients, and not only for people in the HBPoS under sections 135 and 136. On the day of our visit, all patients using the HBPoS had been detained under the Mental Health Act (MHA), and all 3 beds were being used as ‘admission beds’. At least 1 of the patients had been in the HBPoS for over 5 days, and staff told us that patients sometimes remained in the HBPoS for 10 days. We asked the trust for data to show how long people stayed in the HBPoS, but the trust did not provide this information.
The HBPoS was located in the basement area of the building, and window positions inside the patients’ bedrooms meant that whilst patients could see daylight, they were unable to have an outside view. The suites did not have direct access to fresh air and staff told us windows did not open.
The HBPoS had 1 bathroom with a shower and toilet, and a lounge area which were shared between all patients in the HBPoS. Staff had to escort patients from their bedrooms to the bathroom to carry out their hygiene needs. At the time of our visit, the HBPoS was occupied by 1 female and 2 male patients. As all 3 people in the HBPoS had been detained under the MHA and were not being detained under section 136, the HBPoS was acting as an inpatient ward at that time and mixed sex guidance would apply. NHS England guidance states that patients should not have to share toilet or bathroom facilities with members of the opposite sex. The guidance also states that, where mixing occurs, providers should take action to resolve the situation as soon as possible. The Mental Health Code of Practice states that ‘all sleeping and bathroom areas should be segregated, and patients should not have to walk through an area occupied by another sex to reach toilets or bathrooms. Separate male and female toilets and bathrooms should be provided, as should women-only day rooms. Women-only environments are important because of the increased risk of sexual and physical abuse and risk of trauma for women who have had prior experience of such abuse’. The HBPoS did not provide appropriate segregation of toilet facilities for admitted patients and did not provide a women-only day room. In July 2025, a previous female patient reported to us that they had felt unsafe in the HBPoS after being left alone with a male patient.
Staff told us when a patient’s level of distress was not manageable in the HBPoS staff transferred them to more suitable areas within the trust. However, the trust provided data showing there had been 26 instances of seclusion under the MHA in the HBPoS in the 6 months prior to our inspection. The data did not always state whether the seclusion was carried out on inpatients or people detained under section 135 or section 136. Seclusion is the supervised confinement and isolation of a patient, away from other patients, in an area the patient is prevented from leaving, where it is of immediate necessity for the purpose of containment of severe behavioural disturbance which is likely to cause harm to others. The MHA Code of Practice states that seclusion should only take place in a designated seclusion facility that is not used for any other purpose. Of the 26 recorded instances of seclusion in the HBPoS, 6 exceeded 24 hours, with 3 of those 6 exceeding 48 hours.
The service risk register included a risk from September 2025 that the HBPoS did not have safe hinge doors. Safe hinge doors are alarmed to alert staff when someone is attempting a suspended ligature. These doors reduce the risk of death by hanging. The risk stated that there was no funding in place to fit safe hinge doors in the HBPoS. Control measures had been put in place, including one to one observation when a patient was in the HBPoS under section 136. However, it was also noted that if a person was detained in the HBPoS in an ‘admission bed’, then patient observations could be reduced based on an individual risk assessment. The risk stated that as the HBPoS was frequently used for ‘admission beds’, safe hinge doors would reduce the risk of harm.
We raised our concerns about the HBPoS to the trust, and they responded with proposed actions to address each concern. The trust told us about the limitations of the existing premises due to it being a listed building and provided details about plans to build a new HBPoS unit which would include a mental health crisis assessment centre (MHCAC). The trust told us that funding was available and plans were being developed. There were no confirmed dates for construction or opening of the new facility.
We visited Exeter CRHTT where we observed and heard from staff about the challenges of the CRHTT working environment. We observed that CRHTT staff were sat very close to one another without partitions to offer a barrier to noise. Staff told us this was stressful as it was difficult to have sensitive telephone calls with people who used services. Staff told us that the room regularly exceeded its capacity, leading to staff members having to sit on desks as seats were unavailable. Some staff told us that they escalated the impacts of these environmental issues on staff wellbeing and quality of care by logging incident reports. Exeter CRHTT estates had been listed on the service’s risk register since May 2022. The risk register explained that the Exeter CRHTT had been moved to its current premises on a temporary basis due to a vermin infestation in their previous office in January 2025. The risk register listed risks including insufficient workstations, lack of confidentiality, and overcrowding, and said these were having a severe impact on staff wellbeing and safe and effective service delivery. The last review of this risk had been in January 2026, and no future target review date had been added. The risk register recommendations included that Exeter CRHTT be prioritised for relocation to an appropriate working environment. An action stated there was work being undertaken to secure this.
The risk register also stated from May 2022 that Exeter CRHTT had telephone issues. Staff told us that only 4 of 8 telephones in the office were functional at the time of our inspection. We were told that replacement telephones had been ordered some months prior but had not yet been supplied. There was only one telephone that had voicemail functionality, which meant people who used services could not always leave a voicemail. Headsets had been ordered and supplied to resolve the issue of service users being able to hear office noise. However, the headsets were not yet functional as the technology team had not yet visited to set them up.
East Mid Devon CRHTT was listed on the risk register as it did not have enough appropriate workstations and staff were sometimes working from laptops at inappropriate tables for prolonged periods. The East Mid Devon CRHTT office contained 6 workstations, whilst there were 22 staff and 2.4 vacancies. The last review of this risk was January 2026, and no future target review date had been added. Staff had been told to raise an incident whenever they had to work at an inappropriate table for more than 60 minutes.
A risk had been added to the service risk register in November 2025 relating to heating issues at the First Response Service premises. Staff told us they had to wear blankets in winter as the premises was so cold. The trust was maintaining oversight of the situation by conducting environmental risk assessments every month and explained that the issue was due to the age of the building and its listed status. Managers explored temporary solutions with staff and introduced these where safe to do so, for example heaters had been approved and staff were able to use these at the time of our inspection.
However, we also saw positive examples of technology being used to improve and deliver safe care and treatment. In FRS, managers had implemented a new telephony system in September 2025. The trust paid for dedicated support from the telephony provider to ensure the system ran well and to make any necessary changes promptly. FRS managers worked closely with partners to understand the demands for the service and to identify improvements. For example, FRS received feedback that NHS 111 Option 1 were receiving around 300-400 redirected FRS calls per month. FRS managers acted on this feedback and found that this was due to an overflow setting that remained from the old telephony system. They acted by changing the overflow settings and used the new telephony system to monitor the impact on abandoned call rates. This gave managers the data they needed to decide that it was safe to turn the overflow setting off.

Safe and effective staffing

Score: 1

The service did not make sure there were enough qualified, skilled, and experienced staff, who received effective support, supervision and development. There were high vacancy and sickness rates and low supervision rates in some CRHTTs.


The service was budgeted for 141.03 whole time equivalent (WTE) staff in January 2026, and 71.82 of these were qualified staff. There were 17.8 vacancies across the service, and 12.8 of these were for nursing staff. Vacancy rates for all roles had reduced from 17.7% in January 2025 to 9.6% in January 2026, however some teams still had high levels of vacancies. In January 2026, East and Mid Devon CRHTT had 4.85 nursing vacancies and was budgeted for 15.74 WTE staff, which meant a vacancy rate of 30.8%. Torbay CRHTT had 3.32 nursing vacancies and was budgeted for 12.62 WTE staff, which meant a vacancy rate of 26.3%. Staff at all levels told us the service was actively trying to recruit into these roles, and some vacancies had recently been filled. However, at the time of our inspection these staff were not yet in role.


Managers told us they deployed bank staff to maintain safe staffing levels. Data provided by the trust showed the highest number of shifts covered by bank staff between January 2025 and January 2026 was 101 at FRS, 27 of which were for nursing staff. In the same period, East and Mid Devon CRHTT had 81 bank shifts, 28 for nursing staff, Exeter CRHTT had 47 bank shifts, 28 for nursing staff, and Torbay CRHTT had 11 bank shifts, 8 for nursing staff. There was no use of agency staff in any of the CRHTTs. In the HBPoS, agency staff were sometimes used to cover shifts. Between January 2025 and January 2026, 35 shifts were covered by agency staff, 3 of which were for nursing staff. In the same period, 84 shifts were covered by bank staff, 8 for nursing staff.

We asked the trust to provide data showing how many shifts had remained unfilled in the 12 months prior to our inspection. Data provided by the trust showed that 14 shifts had remained unfilled at FRS, 57 at Exeter CRHTT, 37 at East and Mid Devon CRHTT, 36 at South Hams and West Devon CRHTT, 9 at Torbay CRHTT, 6 at Teignbridge CRHTT and 5 at North Devon CRHTT. The HBPoS had recorded 177 unfilled shifts in the same period.


A risk on the service risk register stated that the HBPoS did not currently have a pharmacist assigned which sometimes delayed medication reconciliation and ordering of stock. The risk also stated that as the HBPoS had no dedicated junior doctor and no dedicated consultant time, patients detained in ‘admission beds’ experienced delays to care and treatment compared to if they had been admitted to an inpatient ward. This included delays to regular patient reviews, Mental Health Act related reviews and responsibilities for ‘admission bed’ patients, such as consideration of leave, consideration of change of observation levels, and consideration of discharge from detention. However, the HBPoS had recently been allocated a part-time registered clinician who had responsibility for patients in ‘admission beds’. The report said a process would be created to reduce the risks associated with being detained in an ‘admission bed’ in the HBPoS. Managers and staff told us when bank nursing staff were used, those staff received an induction, relevant mandatory training and were familiar with the service. FRS held routine inductions lasting 2 weeks for internal bank staff, and this could be extended if staff felt they needed additional time to reach full competency.


The trust’s target sickness rate was 4.75%. Between February 2025 and January 2026 some teams in the service had high levels of sickness. Exeter CRHTT averaged 11.6%, FRS and East and Mid Devon CRHTT both averaged 10.5%, Whilst South Hams and West Devon CRHTT averaged 10.4%. However, Teignbridge CRHTT’s average of 3.69% met the trust’s target sickness rate. The service risk register included a risk for reduced staffing levels due to an increase in sickness absence, and stated that this was impacting service delivery, staff wellbeing and the team’s ability to maintain safe and effective crisis care. This risk had been added in February 2026 and included a range of recommendations, including an immediate review of staffing capacity, and escalation to senior leadership for guidance. The service provided turnover data and told us they did not currently have a staff turnover target. Between February 2025 and January 2026, across the service the average turnover rate was 15%, with a 10% turnover rate across CRHTTs, 5% at the HBPoS and 3% for FRS.

The trust had a mandatory learning policy which was in date and set out how mandated learning would help staff develop and retain the necessary skills and knowledge to work safely. The service monitored training compliance according to their policy and provided data showing staff had received and were up to date with mandatory training. Average compliance across the service was 93.9% for the 12 months prior to our inspection, and all teams had an average mandatory training compliance of 89% or more. However, data provided by the trust showed that for HBPoS staff in January 2026, compliance rates were 60% for Immediate Life Support (ILS) training, and 68.2% for Basic Life Support (BLS).


Staff told us, and we saw in incident reports, that FRS was operating on its business continuity plan (BCP) at the time of our inspection. A BCP is when a service puts a plan in place to ensure safe, effective and continuous care during unexpected events or disruptions. A new clinical assessment service model had been introduced in December 2025 where CRHTTs had taken full responsibility for 4-hour face-to-face assessments, which FRS had previously supported. However, staff and managers told us that low CRHTT staffing meant they did not always have resource to complete all 4-hour face-to-face assessments, so FRS were continuing to support with these. FRS attended a daily morning call with CRHTTs to agree which assessments they would complete.


The trust told us that locally mandated breakaway training had ceased for FRS from April 2025 due to FRS staff no longer having face-to-face contact with people who use services. Though frequency had reduced since CRHTTs had taken on responsibility for face-to-face assessments, due to the BCP arrangement, FRS staff were still sometimes doing face-to-face assessments.
Each HBPoS staff shift consisted of 1 registered mental health nurse (RMN) and 4 healthcare assistants (HCAs) as a minimum. A supernumerary qualified nurse had a clinical audit shift per week so could be utilised if needed. There was a dedicated HBPoS staffing team, and staff we spoke with felt there were enough staff to cover the shifts over a 24-hour period. The approved mental health professionals (AMHP) service told us that communication and processes were improved by having dedicated staff in place.


Staff told us they could be called to work on other wards if the HBPoS was empty or had low numbers. Staff told us that staff numbers never dropped below 4 because that was the minimum needed for a restraint team. In the event of an emergency, there was a dedicated response staff member on each of the wards onsite. Staff we spoke with told us the on-call medics were very responsive when needed.


The trust had a supervision policy which stated that clinical and management supervision should happen at least monthly. We saw that managers provided staff with supervision where they met to discuss operational issues, learning from practice, personal support or professional development. The trust provided data for supervision, however, it was unclear if this data was for clinical or management supervision, of it both were combined. Between February 2025 and January 2026, average compliance for supervision across the CRHTTs was 81.2%, which was below the service’s target of 85%. Some teams had lower compliance rates than others. In the same period, Exeter CRHTT had a compliance rate of 63.3%, Torbay CRHTT 69.4%, East and Mid Devon CRHTT 76.8%, and Teignbridge 80.0%. The remaining CRHTTs all had compliance rates over the service’s target of 85%. Low compliance for management supervision at Exeter and East and Mid Devon CRHTTs was on the service’s risk register, and noted that operational pressures, rota gaps and high caseloads were barriers to completing timely supervisions. Low compliance rates at Torbay CRHTT were not on the service’s risk register.


The trust had a Career Conversation (appraisal) policy, which was up to date and set out how the trust would support staff’s personal growth and develop talent across the service. The average compliance rate for staff receiving a Career Conversation in the 12 months prior to our inspection was 80.5%, whilst some teams achieved a lower compliance rate than others. East and Mid crisis resolution and home treatment team (CRHTT) had an average compliance of 60.9%, Exeter CRHTT 62.9%, and the First Response Service an average of 72.4%. However, Teignbridge CRHTT had a compliance rate of 100%.

Infection prevention and control

Score: 3

The service assessed and managed the risk of infection. They detected and controlled the risk of it spreading.
All areas were clean and were well-maintained. Furniture was in a good state of repair. The service assessed and managed the risk of infection. They detected and controlled the risk of it spreading and shared concerns with appropriate agencies promptly. Cleaning records were up to date and demonstrated that areas were cleaned regularly.
The service had an infection prevention and control policy which was up to date and regularly reviewed.
Staff adhered to infection control principles, including handwashing. Staff received training in Infection, Prevention and Control. We observed hand sanitising gel and hand hygiene posters in all premises we visited.
The trust provided compliance data for its mandatory training. Across the service, the average compliance for Infection Control training was 95.3%, and all teams had a compliance rate of over 80%.

Medicines optimisation

Score: 1

The service did not always make sure that medicines and treatments were safe and met people’s needs, capacities and preferences. Teams did not always record medicine-related information consistently, and key information was sometimes missing from patient records. Physical health monitoring was inconsistent.


The service had systems and processes in place to support people safely with their medicines in the HBPoS and CRHTTs. However, documentation of medicines was not always recorded consistently across the service. Our previous inspection report in 2017 stated that the trust should ensure that systems that were in place to monitor the administration of people’s medicine were used and completed accurately.


At this inspection, there was no standard medicines chart or electronic prescribing system in use in CRHTTs. In one team, staff had created their own medicines lists to take to the person’s home. There was variation in how medicines were documented in patients’ records, which made it difficult to confirm what had been prescribed or administered. This increased the risk of medicines related errors. Staff also reported that the current electronic patient record system was hard to navigate and that important medicines information could be difficult to locate. We also found an example where a patient with a learning disability had not been flagged on the system and reasonable adjustments were not documented.


Medicines reconciliation was carried out, however, in some records allergy status was missing. Staff did not complete documentation in line with trust policy when filling dosette boxes or recording consent to remove individuals’ own medicines from their possession. A dosette box is a medication organiser with separate compartments for different days and times, helping people see what to take and when.


Staff regularly reviewed medicines for clinical effectiveness and side effects. Records showed regular reviews and communication with GPs when medicines changed. The service used the same electronic patient record systems as most GPs in the area. Staff had access to GP care records including people’s current medicines and physical health results, which supported with prescribing decisions.


Physical health monitoring was carried out across the service, but it was not consistent. Staff in the HBPoS completed physical health monitoring and escalated abnormal results, with support available from a physical health lead nurse for people with more complex needs. However, staff in CRHTTs told us they experienced challenges when arranging some physical health checks and medicines supplies through GPs. Some GPs were not able to complete the required monitoring needed for certain medicines, which meant the CRHTTs had to continue carrying out these checks and supply of medicines themselves.


The service was aware of this and was taking steps to address the issue. A risk relating to pressures on physical health monitoring and prescribing in the service as a result of GPs withdrawing from the shared care agreement had been added to the risk register in July 2025, had last been reviewed in April 2025 and had been rated with a score of 16 which meant the risk was high. The risk had not been reviewed since April 2025 and there was no next review date recorded. This risk register entry included actions which had assigned owners and target completion dates. Actions included recruitment of additional physical health support staff, and the development of hub and spoke models to deliver physical health monitoring. A shared care agreement is a formal arrangement where an NHS trust specialist initiates treatment and, once the person is stable, transfers responsibility for ongoing prescribing and monitoring to the GP.
There were processes in place to titrate clozapine (an antipsychotic requiring regular blood monitoring). Staff completed the required monitoring to ensure clozapine was used safely, in line with national guidance.


Medicines were generally stored securely. Emergency medicines were available, and audit trails for controlled stationery were well maintained. Pre-packed medicines were used appropriately. However, in the Exeter CRHTT, temperature monitoring was recorded inconsistently, and we found an example where several strips of the same medicine had been placed together in a single box, which did not follow safe storage practice.


Medicines audits carried out by the service between 2024 and 2026 found several areas for improvement. The trust provided a summary report of these audits, which reviewed the storage, security, temperature monitoring, record-keeping and governance of medicines across community sites. The report included services we did not inspect for this report, such as community mental health teams (CMHTs). The report included details of overall compliance and key findings. Overall compliance for Patient Group Directions (PGDs) was rated ‘low-moderate’, with the key finding that there were significant documentation and screening issues. A PGD is a legally approved framework which allows authorised staff to give certain medicines to people who meet set criteria, without needing a prescription each time. Only 31% of the trust’s sites that were using PGDs had no discrepancies. There were no actions listed for this issue. Overall compliance for NHS prescription forms management was rated ‘moderate-low’, with the key finding that there were missing forms and inconsistent recording. Actions were recorded for this issue, and included incident reports being completed where necessary, staff and medical teams being informed, and procedures being re-communicated. There was no information about when these actions would be completed by or how they would be carried out.


In the HBPoS, when 'as required' (PRN) medicines were used for the management of anxiety or agitation, staff did not always record the reason for use or if it had been effective. We found one medicine was given outside the legal period of a detention.


Limited pharmacy cover impacted the service’s ability to fully support the service. Where there was pharmacy support available in some areas, staff were positive about their relationships and the benefit of the support given. There was a supportive culture regarding reporting and learning lessons from medicines incidents.